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Introduction
During the last decade, the Italian economy has experienced one of the deepest recessions of the post-war period. The Italian banking sector was significantly affected by the crisis: bad loans piled up, both reducing revenues and increasing loan loss provisions (LLP, see Figure 1 , 2a and 3a), which led to further revenue losses.
The main function of LLP is to cover expected losses; however, it can also be an important tool to pursue other objectives, such as stabilising earnings and dividends over the cycle. Most recently the Bank of Italy has put pressure on the banking industry to assess accurately the quality of loans and to make adequate provision for the increasing credit risk; at present the coverage ratio (the ratio of loan loss reserves to total bad loans, see Figure 2b ) appears to be quite different for commercial vis-à-vis local banks (see Figure 3b ).
Previous research has highlighted three main drivers of managerial discretionary behaviour: income smoothing, signalling and capital regulation. These factors, together with non-discretionary components and economic fluctuations, determine the provisioning policy of banks. This might also be affected by different approaches to evaluating bad loans (see Dewenter and Hess, 2003) :
"relationship" banks may have better information on customers than "transactional" banks, and therefore less risky loans (or higher recovery rates). On the other hand, the former may have a stronger incentive to "evergreen" loans compared to the latter. In any case, a "relationship" bank will always have a lower LLP, whether as a result of a correct evaluation of the expected loss or of managerial discretionary behaviour. This paper uses data from a panel of more than 400 Italian banks for the period 2001 -2012 to examine the main determinants of LLP. In addition to the factors already mentioned, which are commonly considered in the empirical literature, we also analyse the possible effects of guaranteed loans, coverage ratios and the level of risk for the discretionary component. A bank with a higher stock of collateralised loans (a higher coverage ratio, and a lower level of risk) can, in principle, reduce expected future losses, which obviously affects the LLP decision-making process.
The main findings of the analysis are as follows. First, LLP in Italian banks seems to be driven mainly by cyclical and non-discretionary components. Second, although this result holds for local banks as well, LLP for this category of banks is also significantly affected by collateralised loans. This could explain the lower LLP and coverage ratios exhibited in recent years by the Cooperative Credit Banks (CCBs) compared to other categories of banks 1 .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the LLP determinants.
Section 3 presents the dataset and some preliminary statistics. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology and discusses the main results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Literature Review
There is a huge literature on the linkages between bank lending activity and business cycles.
A recent strand has focused on how provisions contribute to the pro-cyclicality of the financial sector, being lower when output and credit are expanding and higher when they are contracting.
LLP is also related to credit and business cycle fluctuations because during economic booms and downturns credit risk might be incorrectly assessed. Asea and Blomberg (1998) recessions in Italy, and also that it can be partially explained by the lending policy adopted during good times.
The business cycle could also have an impact on the non-discretionary components in backward-looking provisioning systems. According to Whalen (1994) and Beaver and Engle (1996) , LLP is related to contemporary loans, while Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) find that the ratio of LLP to total loans is linked to the business cycle. Some studies report a time-lag between riskier loans which are granted during economic boom and LLP in the following downturn, which follows backward-looking rules (Keeton, 1999; Jiménez and Saurina, 2005; Caporale et al., 2014).
LLP can also be affected by discretionary components, such as income smoothing. This can be defined as a practice aiming at the reduction of variability of net profit over time. In other words, managers will increase (decrease) LLP when earnings are high (low) in order to stabilise net profit.
Bank managers might have significant incentives to adopt income smoothing procedures: adjusting a bank's current performance to a firm-specific mean (Collins et al, 1995) , allowing managers to ensure a steady flow of dividends to bank stockholders, improving the risk perception that regulators have about the bank, keeping a bank's stock price stable by reducing earnings volatility.
Managerial self-interest incentives could also lead to income smoothing, with the aim of stabilising over time managers' compensation, and minimising the probability of being fired (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) .
Furthermore, regulators are interested in reducing banks' pro-cyclical behaviour, and therefore an increase in loan loss reserves during good times, from which to draw when the economy slows down. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) find that regional banks are more likely to exhibit income smoothing behaviour, while Ma (1988) shows that US commercial banks used LLP to smooth earnings, whilst there is no relationship between LLP and loan portfolio quality. multi-country study find that the incentive to smooth earnings is positively related to developed and market-oriented financial systems, but negatively related to banking systems characterised by higher levels of accounting disclosure, a supervisory framework, and more restrictions on banking activities.
Banks can also decide on provision levels to meet capital requirements and avoid the costs resulting from non-compliance; a higher level of provisions, when capital is low, can be used to build up a strong reserve buffer. The evidence on this linkage, though, is mixed. Some empirical studies do not find a significant impact of capital on LLP (Davis and Zhu, 2009; Craig, 2006) , whilst other report either a positive (Collins et al., 1995) or a negative relationship (Moyer, 1990) and Beatty et al., 1995) . LLP could be also used to signal financial strength; specifically financial markets could perceive a higher level of provisions as a signal that bank managers have a positive view on future cash flows after taking into account unexpected changes in non-performing loans. In other words, an unexpected increase in LLP could be viewed as positive news for future earnings, instead of an anticipated future deterioration of the credit portfolio's quality. However, the empirical evidence is again mixed. Liu, Ryan and Wahlen (1997) claim that the market interprets higher discretionary LLP as good news only if banks appear to experience default risk problems. In contrast, Ahmed et al. (1999) do not find any evidence of signalling behaviour.
Data and Descriptive Analysis

Data Sources and Definitions
As mentioned above, the existing literature suggests that LLP could be affected by at least three factors, i.e. the economic cycle, and both the non-discretionary and discretionary behaviour of bank managers. The non-discretionary component is related to credit risk and its aim is to cover expected future credit losses on loans (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engle 1996). During recessions, non-performing loans and defaults on loans are typically high; as a result, LLPs increase. On the other hand, during economic booms firms and households are less likely to become insolvent, and fewer problem loans are identified by banks and supervisory authorities. Therefore, the nondiscretionary components affect LLP countercyclically, and consequently bank earnings and capital; in fact Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) showed that the ratio of LLP to total assets exhibits strong cyclicality.
Several indicators have been used to capture the non-discretionary components of LLP. Furthermore, we incorporate a measure of the expected credit risk defined as the rate of change in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (DNPL i,t Table 2 shows the total number of banks in the selected sample, by year and by category. Local banks represent approximately 80 percent of the banks in our dataset.
Descriptive Statistics
The double-dip recession experienced by the Italian economy between 2008 and 2012 had a significant effect on credit risk: from 2008, the annual rate of growth of LLP for all the banks in our sample increased from 8.3% to more than 15%. Figure 2a shows that the ratio of LLP to total loans almost doubled, from 2.1% in 2008 to 3.7% in 2012. Figure 2b plots Throughtout the sample it is lower than for all banks.
Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3 . The ratio of LLP to bad loans is on average 1.3% of total assets, whilst bad loans represent about 4.4% of total loans. Loans are the main asset (64.9% of total assets). The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and LLP to total assets is, on average, positive and equal to 0.8%, while its one-year-ahead percentage rate of change (SIGN i,t ) indicates that future earnings were expected to decline.
We also clustered the banks according to several criteria. First of all, the sample was split according to bank size. Cluster 1 (Big Size) contains banks with a level of total assets greater than for the 75 th percentile of the sample distribution, while banks with a level of total assets lower than this threshold are in Cluster 2 (Low Size). ). An interesting feature is that riskier banks have a higher percentage of loans relative to total assets. They also have a higher ratio of LLP to total assets (1.6%) and pessimistic expectations about future profitability (SIGN i,t , is on average -57.4%). Table 4 focuses on local banks. These are clustered in eight groups using the same criteria as in Table 3 . It can be seen that they have lower LLP (1.3%) and LOAN i,t (64.1%) than all banks.
Interestingly, local banks in Cluster 1 (Big Size), Cluster 4 (Low Guarantees) and Cluster 8 (Low Coverage Ratio) have a low ratio of LLP to total assets, close to 1.0%. 
Econometric Analysis
The Baseline Regression
The estimation results (see Table 5 ) imply a rejection of the income smoothing hypothesis for both subsamples (2001-2007 and 2008-2012) , which confirms the countercyclical behaviour of LLP. Of the two interactive dummy coefficients only that on IS it • CRISISt i,t is statistically significant. Again, cyclicality in LLP is mainly due to the behaviour of Italian banks during the crisis.
To test signalling behaviour, the baseline specification is expanded by adding SIGN i,t as in Equation (4): 
The coefficient on SIGN i,t is close to 0 and insignificant, which implies a rejection of the 
Testing for Other Effects
Other interactive dummies are added to the baseline specification given by Equation (1) The results in Table 6 (for HSIZE i,t ) and in Table 7 (for LSIZE i,t ) provide evidence of a size effect: the cyclical behaviour of LLP (negative coefficient) is confirmed for small Italian banks, and only during the crisis.
To examine the role of guarantees we define a dummy variable, HGUA i,t , which takes value 1 if the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans is greater than that for the 75 th percentile of the sample distribution, and 0 otherwise.
LGUA i,t is instead defined as being equal to 1 when HGUA i,t is equal to 0, and 0 otherwise. Equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) include respectively the dummies 
The results in Table 8 (for HGUA i,t ) and in Table 9 (for LGUA i,t ) confirm that the cyclical behaviour (negative coefficient) of LLP only characterises banks with a better guaranteed credit portfolio, particularly during the crisis.
LLP could also be affected by the coverage ratio (CR) of non-performing loans. In fact, an appropriate CR is a requirement imposed by the Italian banking supervisor (the Bank of Italy 
The results in Table 10 (for HCR i,t ) and in Table 11 (for LCR i,t ) confirm that the countercyclical behaviour of LLP is more pronounced for banks with a lower coverage ratio.
CR is also a measure of risk. Following Lepetit et al. (2014), we use as a proxy for bank risk the standard deviation of adjusted Return on Equity, computed using 3-year rolling windows 
IS i,t • CRISIS t in Equation (2).
Local Banking
Finally, we focus on the CCBs, which are typically small local banks (LBs where LOCAL i,t is a dummy variable which takes value 1 for local banks and 0 otherwise.
The results in Table 14 point to a cyclical behaviour in LLP for local banks as well.
However, this feature is weaker than for banks in general over the full sample, but stronger during the crisis. To shed further light on this issue, we estimate three further specifications including respectively interactive dummies for the effect of collateralised credit, overage ratios and of the level risk on LLPs, as follows: The results are reported in Tables 14 -20 . They indicate that the stronger cyclicality of LLP in local banks can be explained by: 1) a bigger collateral (Table 15) ; 2) a lower coverage ratio (Tables 17 and 18 ) and 3) higher risk (Tables 19 and 20) . (2) is consistent with the fact that supervisory activity is stronger and more focused on LLPs for local banks (capital requirements instead for big banks), and also the lower coverage ratio of LBs before (and during) the crisis. As already mentioned, CR is also a measure of risk (as confirmed by 3).
Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of LLP in Italian banks over the period 2001-2012, using balance sheet data. In addition to the most common explanatory variables, we also consider the effects of guaranteed loans, coverage ratios and the level of risk. Moreover, we also provide evidence for local banks.
The analysis is carried out using the generalized method of moments (GMM) with first differences (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). The findings suggest that the main drivers of LLP in
Italian banks are non-discretionary behaviour and cyclical components, whilst the discretionaty behaviour of bank managers and expectations about future potential losses do not appear to play a role. Further, a higher level of collateralised loans, which can reduce credit risk and future losses, has a negative and significant impact.
14 Concerning local banks, their LLP strategy seems to be less pro-cyclical than that of banks in general. However, during the economic crisis of 2008-2012, it was more cyclical than for the full sample of banks. Possible reasons are the fact that the loans of local banks are generally more collateralised, their cyclical behavior is more strongly affected by supervisory activity, and their coverage ratio is lower than for banks in general. Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors'calculations using data from Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). CAPi,.t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). CAPi,.t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association). bank has a Tier1 Ratio greater than the level associated to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution and 0 otherwise. Definition, sources, number of observations, and preliminary statistics are shown in Tables 1-4 . The regression method is the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significance respectively at the 10%, at 5% and at 1% level. Source: Authors' calculations using data from by Istat and ABI (Italian Banking Association).
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